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Russell argues against Plato's theory of forms as follows:

If appearance really appears, it is not nothing, and is therefore part of reality; this is an argument of the correct Parmenidean sort. If appearance does not really appear, why trouble our heads about it? But perhaps someone will say: "Appearance does not really appear, but it appears to appear." This will not help, for we shall ask again: "Does it really appear to appear, or only apparently appear to appear?" Sooner or later, if appearance is even to appear to appear, we must reach something that really appears, and is therefore part of reality

This argument is clever linguistically; but I do not find it satisfactory. (I think Russell may be mocking it himself, when he says "this is an argument of the correct Parmenidean sort.") To base an argument about cosmology on human syntax seems to me overly limiting, although this is admittedly how Plato and his predecessors constructed their arguments.